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A Class of Two-Weight and Three-Weight Codes
and Their Applications in Secret Sharing
Kelan Ding and Cunsheng Ding
Abstract
In this paper, a class of two-weight and three-weight linear codes over GF(p) is constructed, and their
application in secret sharing is investigated. Some of the linear codes obtained are optimal in the sense that
they meet certain bounds on linear codes. These codes have applications also in authentication codes, association
schemes, and strongly regular graphs, in addition to their applications in consumer electronics, communication and
data storage systems.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout this paper, let p be an odd prime and let q = pm for some positive integer m. An [n, k, d]
code C over GF(p) is a k-dimensional subspace of GF(p)n with minimum (Hamming) distance d. Let Ai
denote the number of codewords with Hamming weight i in a code C of length n. The weight enumerator
of C is defined by 1+A1z+A2z2 + · · ·+Anzn. The weight distribution (1,A1, . . . ,An) is an important
research topic in coding theory, as it contains crucial information as to estimate the error correcting
capability and the probability of error detection and correction with respect to some algorithms. A code
C is said to be a t-weight code if the number of nonzero Ai in the sequence (A1,A2, · · · ,An) is equal to t.
Let D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn} ⊆GF(q). Let Tr denote the trace function from GF(q) onto GF(p) throughout
this paper. We define a linear code of length n over GF(p) by
CD = {(Tr(xd1),Tr(xd2), . . . ,Tr(xdn)) : x ∈ GF(q)}, (1)
and call D the defining set of this code CD.
This construction is generic in the sense that many classes of known codes could be produced by
selecting the defining set D ⊆ GF(q). This construction technique was employed in [15] and [16] for
obtaining linear codes with a few weights.
The objective of this paper is to construct a class of linear codes over GF(p) with two and three nonzero
weights using this generic construction method, and investigate their application in secret sharing. Some
of the linear codes obtained in this paper are optimal in the sense that they meet some bounds on linear
codes. The linear codes with a few weights presented in this paper have applications also in authentication
codes [17], association schemes [5], and strongly regular graphs [5], in addition to their applications in
consumer electronics, communication and data storage systems.
The research of C. Ding was supported by the Hong Kong Research Grants Council, under Project No. 16301114.
K. Ding is with the State Key Laboratory of Information Security, the Institute of Information Engineering, The Chinese Academy of
Sciences, Beijing, China. Email: dingkelan@iie.ac.cn
C. Ding is with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear
Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Email: cding@ust.hk
2II. THE LINEAR CODES WITH TWO AND THREE WEIGHTS
We only describe the codes and introduce their parameters in this section. The proofs of their parameters
will be given in Section III.
In this paper, the defining set D of the code CD of (1) is given by
D = {x ∈ GF(q)∗ : Tr(x2) = 0}. (2)
Theorem 1. Let m > 1 be odd, and let D be defined in (2). Then the set CD of (1) is a [pm−1−1,m] code
over GF(p) with the weight distribution in Table I, where Aw = 0 for all other weights w not listed in the
table.
TABLE I
THE WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION OF THE CODES OF THEOREM 1
Weight w Multiplicity Aw
0 1
(p−1)
(
pm−2− p m−32
)
p−1
2
(
pm−1 + p
m−1
2
)
(p−1)pm−2 pm−1−1
(p−1)
(
pm−2 + p
m−3
2
)
p−1
2
(
pm−1− p m−12
)
Example 1. Let (p,m) = (3,5). Then the code CD has parameters [80,5,48] and weight enumerator
1+90z48 +80z54 +72z60.
Theorem 2. Let m ≥ 2 be even, and let D be defined in (2). Then the code CD over GF(p) of (1) has
parameters [
pm−1− (−1)( p−12 )2 m2 (p−1)p m−22 −1,m
]
and the weight distribution in Table II, where Aw = 0 for all other weights w not listed in the table.
TABLE II
THE WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION OF THE CODES OF THEOREM 2
Weight w Multiplicity Aw
0 1
(p−1)pm−2 pm−1− (−1)( p−12 )2 m2 (p−1)p m−22 −1
(p−1)
(
pm−2− (−1)( p−12 )2 m2 p m−22
)
(p−1)
(
pm−1 +(−1)( p−12 )2 m2 p m−22
)
Example 2. Let (p,m) = (5,4). Then the code CD has parameters [104,4,80] and weight enumerator
1+ 520z80 + 104z100. The best linear code of length 104 and dimension 4 over GF(5) has minimum
weight 81.
It is observed that the weights in the code CD have a common divisor p− 1. This indicates that the
code CD may be punctured into a shorter one whose weight distribution can be easily derived from that
of the original code CD. This is indeed true and can be done as follows.
Note that Tr(ax2) = 0 for all a ∈ GF(p) if Tr(x2) = 0. Hence, the set D of (2) can be expressed as
D = (GF(p)∗) ¯D = {ab : a ∈ GF(p)∗ and b ∈ ¯D}, (3)
where di/d j 6∈GF(p)∗ for every pair of distinct elements di and d j in ¯D. Then the code C ¯D is a punctured
version of CD whose parameters are given in the following two corollaries.
Corollary 3. Let m > 1 be odd, and let ¯D be defined in (3). Then the set C
¯D of (1) is a [(pm−1−1)/(p−
1),m] code over GF(p) with the weight distribution in Table III, where Aw = 0 for all other weights w
not listed in the table.
3TABLE III
THE WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION OF THE CODES OF COROLLARY 3
Weight w Multiplicity Aw
0 1
pm−2− p m−32 p−12
(
pm−1 + p
m−1
2
)
pm−2 pm−1−1
pm−2 + p
m−3
2 p−12
(
pm−1− p m−12
)
Example 3. Let (p,m) = (3,5). Then the code C
¯D has parameters [40,5,24] and weight enumerator
1+ 90z24 + 80z27 + 72z30. This code is optimal in the sense that any ternary code of length 40 and
dimension 5 cannot have minimum distance 25 or more [20].
Corollary 4. Let m ≥ 2 be even, and let ¯D be defined in (3). Then the code C
¯D over GF(p) of (1) has
parameters [
pm−1−1
p−1 − (−1)
( p−12 )
2 m
2 p
m−2
2 ,m
]
and the weight distribution in Table IV, where Aw = 0 for all other weights w not listed in the table.
TABLE IV
THE WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION OF THE CODES OF COROLLARY 4
Weight w Multiplicity Aw
0 1
pm−2 pm−1− (−1)( p−12 )2 m2 (p−1)p m−22 −1
pm−2− (−1)( p−12 )2 m2 p m−22 (p−1)
(
pm−1 +(−1)( p−12 )2 m2 p m−22
)
Example 4. Let (p,m) = (5,4). Then the code C
¯D has parameters [26,4,20] and weight enumerator
1+520z20 +104z25. This code is optimal due to the Griesmer bound.
III. THE PROOFS OF THE MAIN RESULTS
Our task of this section is to prove Theorems 1 and 2, while Corollaries 3 and 4 follow directly from
Theorems 1 and 2, respectively.
A. Some auxiliary results
To prove Theorems 1 and 2, we need the help of a number of lemmas that are described and proved
in the sequel. We start with group characters and Gauss sums.
An additive character of GF(q) is a nonzero function χ from GF(q) to the set of nonzero complex
numbers such that χ(x+ y) = χ(x)χ(y) for any pair (x,y) ∈ GF(q)2. For each b ∈ GF(q), the function
χb(c) = εTr(bc)p for all c ∈ GF(q) (4)
defines an additive character of GF(q), where εp = e2pi
√−1/p
. When b= 0, χ0(c)= 1 for all c∈GF(q), and
is called the trivial additive character of GF(q). The character χ1 in (4) is called the canonical additive
character of GF(q). It is known that every additive character of GF(q) can be written as χb(x) = χ1(bx)
[24, Theorem 5.7].
Since the multiplicative group GF(q)∗ is cyclic, all the characters of the multiplicative group GF(q)∗
are given by
ψ j(αk) = e2pi
√−1 jk/(q−1), k = 0,1, · · · ,q−2,
4where 0 ≤ j ≤ q− 2 and α is a generator of GF(q)∗. These ψ j are called multiplicative characters of
GF(q), and form a group of order q− 1 with identity element ψ0. The character ψ(q−1)/2 is called the
quadratic character of GF(q), and is denoted by η in this paper. We extend this quadratic character by
letting η(0) = 0.
The Gauss sum G(η,χ1) over GF(q) is defined by
G(η,χ1) = ∑
c∈GF(q)∗
η(c)χ1(c) = ∑
c∈GF(q)
η(c)χ1(c) (5)
and the Gauss sum G( ¯η, χ¯1) over GF(p) is defined by
G( ¯η, χ¯1) = ∑
c∈GF(p)∗
¯η(c)χ¯1(c) = ∑
c∈GF(p)
¯η(c)χ¯1(c), (6)
where ¯η and χ¯1 are the quadratic and canonical additive characters of GF(p), respectively.
The following lemma is proved in [24, Theorem 5.15].
Lemma 5. With the symbols and notation above, we have
G(η,χ1) = (−1)m−1
√−1(
p−1
2 )
2m√q
and
G( ¯η, χ¯1) =
√−1(
p−1
2 )
2√
p.
We will need the following lemma [24, Theorem 5.33].
Lemma 6. Let χ be a nontrivial additive character of GF(q) with q odd, and let f (x) = a2x2+a1x+a0 ∈
GF(q)[x] with a2 6= 0. Then
∑
c∈GF(q)
χ( f (c)) = χ(a0−a21(4a2)−1)η(a2)G(η,χ).
The conclusion of the following lemma is straightforward. For completeness, we provide a proof below.
Lemma 7. If m ≥ 2 is even, then η(y) = 1 for each y ∈ GF(p)∗. If m is odd, then η(y) = ¯η(y) for each
y ∈ GF(p).
Proof: Let α be a generator of GF(q)∗. Notice that every y ∈ GF(p)∗ can be expressed as α q−1p−1 j,
where 0≤ j ≤ p−2. We have
q−1
p−1 mod 2 = m mod 2.
Hence, every element y∈GF(p)∗ is a square in GF(q) when m is an even positive integer, and η(y) = ¯η(y)
for each y ∈ GF(p) when m is odd. This completes the proof.
Below we prove a few more auxiliary results before proving the main results of this paper.
Lemma 8. We have the following equality:
∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
yTr(x2)
p =
{ 0 if m odd,
(−1)m−1(−1)( p−12 )2 m2 (p−1)√q if m even.
Proof: By Lemma 6, we have
∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
yTr(x2)
p = G(η,χ1) ∑
y∈GF(p)∗
η(y).
5Using Lemma 7, we obtain
∑
y∈GF(p)∗
η(y) =
{
0 if m odd,
p−1 if m even.
The desired conclusion then follows.
The next lemma will be employed later.
Lemma 9. For each a ∈ GF(p), let
na = |{x ∈ GF(q) : Tr(x2) = a}|.
Then
na =


pm−1 if m odd and a = 0,
pm−1− (−1)( p−12 )2 m2 (p−1)p m−22 if m even and a = 0,
pm−1− ¯η(a)(−1) p−12 (−1)( p−12 )2(m+12 )p m−12 if m odd and a 6= 0,
pm−1 +(−1)( p−12 )2 m2 p m−22 if m even and a 6= 0.
Proof: It follows from Lemma 6 that
na =
1
p ∑
x∈GF(q)
∑
y∈GF(p)
ε
y(Tr(x2)−a)
p
= pm−1 +
1
p ∑y∈GF(p)∗ ε
ya
p ∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
Tr(yx2)
p
= pm−1 +
1
p
G(η,χ1) ∑
y∈GF(p)∗
εyap η(y)
=
{
pm−1 + 1pG(η,χ1)∑y∈GF(p)∗ η(y) if a = 0
pm−1 + 1pη(a)G(η,χ1)∑z∈GF(p)∗ εzpη(z) if a 6= 0
=


pm−1 if m odd and a = 0,
pm−1 + p−1p G(η,χ1) if m even and a = 0,
pm−1 + η¯(a)p G(η,χ1)G( ¯η, χ¯1) if m odd and a 6= 0,
pm−1− 1pG(η,χ1) if m even and a 6= 0,
where the first equality follows from the fact that ∑y∈GF(p) χ¯1(yz) = 0 for every z ∈ GF(p)∗. The desired
conclusion then follows from Lemma 5.
The following result will play an important role in proving the main results of this paper.
Lemma 10. Let b ∈ GF(q)∗. Then
∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
Tr(yx2+bzx)
p
=


0 if m odd and Tr(b2) = 0,
− ¯η(Tr(b2))(−1)( p−12 )2(m+12 )(p−1)p m+12 if m odd and Tr(b2) 6= 0,
−(−1)( p−12 )2 m2 (p−1)2p m2 if m even and Tr(b2) = 0,
(−1)( p−12 )2 m2 (p−1)p m2 if m even and Tr(b2) 6= 0.
6Proof: It follows from Lemmas 6 and 7 that
∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
Tr(yx2+bzx)
p
= G(η,χ1) ∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
χ1
(
−b
2z2
4y
)
η(y)
= G(η,χ1) ∑
y1∈GF(p)∗
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
χ1
(−b2z2y1)η
(
1
4y1
)
= G(η,χ1) ∑
y1∈GF(p)∗
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
χ1
(−b2z2y1)η
(
y1
(2y1)2
)
= G(η,χ1) ∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
χ1
(−b2z2y)η(y)
= G(η,χ1) ∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
ε
−z2Tr(b2)y
p η(y)
=
{
G(η,χ1)∑z∈GF(p)∗ ∑y∈GF(p)∗ η(y) if Tr(b2) = 0
G(η,χ1)∑z∈GF(p)∗ ∑y∈GF(p)∗ ε−z
2Tr(b2)y
p η(−z2Tr(b2)y)η(−Tr(b2)) if Tr(b2) 6= 0
=
{
G(η,χ1)(p−1)∑y∈GF(p)∗ η(y) if Tr(b2) = 0
G(η,χ1)η(−Tr(b2))(p−1)∑y∈GF(p)∗ εypη(y) if Tr(b2) 6= 0
=


0 if m odd and Tr(b2) = 0,
G(η,χ1)G( ¯η, χ¯1)η(−Tr(b2))(p−1) if m odd and Tr(b2) 6= 0,
G(η,χ1)(p−1)2 if m even and Tr(b2) = 0,
−G(η,χ1)(p−1) if m even and Tr(b2) 6= 0.
The desired conclusions then follow from Lemmas 5 and 7.
The last auxiliary result we need is the following.
Lemma 11. For any b ∈ GF(q)∗ and any a ∈ GF(p), let
N(b) = |{x ∈ GF(q) : Tr(x2) = 0 and Tr(bx) = 0}|.
Then
N(b) =


pm−2 if m odd and Tr(b2) = 0,
pm−2− ¯η(Tr(b2))(−1)( p−12 )
2
(m+12 )(p−1)p m−32 if m odd and Tr(b2) 6= 0,
pm−2− (−1)( p−12 )
2 m
2 (p−1)p m−22 if m even and Tr(b2) = 0,
pm−2 if m even and Tr(b2) 6= 0.
Proof: By definition, we have
N(b) = p−2 ∑
x∈GF(q)
(
∑
y∈GF(p)
ε
yTr(x2)
p
)(
∑
z∈GF(p)
ε
zTr(bx)
p
)
= p−2 ∑
z∈GF(p)∗
∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
Tr(bzx)
p + p−2 ∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
Tr(yx2)
p +
p−2 ∑
y∈GF(p)∗
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
Tr(yx2+bzx)
p + pm−2.
7Note that
∑
z∈GF(p)∗
∑
x∈GF(q)
ε
Tr(bzx)
p = 0.
The desired conclusions then follow from Lemmas 8 and 10.
B. The proof of Theorems 1 and 2
It follows from Lemma 9 that the length n of the code CD is given by
n = |D|= n0−1 =
{
pm−1−1 if m odd,
pm−1−1− (−1)( p−12 )2 m2 (p−1)p m−22 if m even.
For each b ∈ GF(q)∗, define
cb = (Tr(bd1), Tr(bd2), . . . , Tr(bdn)), (7)
where d1,d2, . . . ,dn are the elements of D. The Hamming weight wt(cb) of cb is n0−N(b), where n0 and
N(b) were defined before.
When m is odd, it follows from Lemmas 9 and 11 that
wt(cb) = n0−N(b) =


(p−1)pm−2 if Tr(b2) = 0,
(p−1)
(
pm−2 + ¯η(Tr(b2))(−1)( p−12 )
2
(m+12 )p
m−3
2
)
if Tr(b2) 6= 0.
The desired conclusions of Theorem 1 then follow from Lemma 9 and the fact that wt(cb)> 0 for each
b ∈ GF(q)∗.
When m is even, it follows from Lemmas 9 and 11 that
wt(cb) = n0−N(b) =


(p−1)pm−2 if Tr(b2) = 0,
(p−1)
(
pm−2− (−1)( p−12 )
2 m
2 p
m−2
2
)
if Tr(b2) 6= 0.
The desired conclusions of Theorem 2 then follow from Lemma 9 and the fact that wt(cb)> 0 for each
b ∈ GF(q)∗.
IV. A GENERALIZATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION
Let f be a function from a finite abelian group (A,+) to a finite abelian group (B,+). A robust measure
of nonlinearity of f is defined by
Pf = max
06=a∈A
max
b∈B
|{x ∈ A : f (x+a)− f (x) = b}|
|A| .
The smaller the value of Pf , the higher the corresponding nonlinearity of f .
It is easily seen that Pf ≥ 1|B| [7]. A function f : A → B has perfect nonlinearity if Pf = 1|B| . A perfect
nonlinear function from a finite abelian group to a finite abelian group of the same order is called a
planar function in finite geometry. Planar functions were introduced by Dembowski and Ostrom in 1968
for the construction of affine planes [12]. We refer to Carlet and Ding [7] for a survey of highly nonlinear
functions, Coulter and Matthews [10] and Ding and Yuan [19] for information about planar functions.
Some known planar functions from GF(q) to GF(q) are the following [7], [10]:
• f (x) = x2.
• f (x) = xpk+1, where m/gcd(m,k) is odd (Dembowski and Ostrom [12]).
• f (x) = x 3k+12 , where p = 3, k is odd, and gcd(m,k) = 1 (Coulter and Matthews [10]).
8• fu(x) = x10−ux6−u2x2, where p = 3 and m is odd (Coulter and Matthews [10] for the case u =−1,
Ding and Yuan [19] for the general case).
Note that planar functions over GF(pm) exist for any pair (p,m) with p being an odd prime number.
The construction of the linear code CD of this paper can be generalized as follows. Let f be a planar
function from GF(q) to GF(q) such that
• f (0) = 0;
• f (x) = f (−x) for all x ∈ GF(q); and
• f (ax) = ah f (x) for all a ∈ GF(p) and x ∈ GF(q), where h is some constant.
Then the set
D f := {x ∈ GF(q)∗ : Tr( f (x)) = 0} ⊂ GF(q)
defines a linear code CD f over GF(p). The code CD f may have the same parameters as the code CD of
this paper. Magma confirms that this is true for all the four classes of planar functions listed above. But
it is open whether CD f and CD have the same parameters and weight distribution for any planar functionf satisfying the three conditions above. It would be nice if this open problem can be settled.
We remark that this construction of linear codes with planar functions here is different from the one
in [8], as the lengths and dimensions of the codes in the two constructions are different.
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE LINEAR CODES IN SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
In this section, we describe and analyse the secret sharing schemes from some of the codes presented
in this paper.
A. Secret sharing schemes
A secret sharing scheme consists of
• a dealer, and a group P = {P1,P2, · · · ,Pℓ} of ℓ participants;
• a secret space S ;
• ℓ share spaces S1, S2, · · · , Sℓ;
• a share computing procedure; and
• a secret recovering procedure.
The dealer will choose a secret s from the secret space S , and will employ the sharing computing
procedure to compute a share of the secret s for each participant Pi, and then give the share to Pi. The
share computed for Pi belongs to the share space Si. When a subset of the participants comes together
with their shares, they may be able to recover the secret s from their shares with the secret recovering
procedure. The secret s and the sharing computing function are known only to the dealer, while the secret
recovering procedure is known to all the participants.
By an access set we mean a group of participants who can determine the secret from their shares. The
access structure of a secret sharing scheme is defined to be the set of all access sets. A minimal access
set is a group of participants who can recover the secret with their shares, but any of its proper subgroups
cannot do so. A secret sharing scheme is said to have the monotone access structure, if any superset of
any access set is also an access set. In a secret sharing scheme with the monotone access structure, the
access structure is totally characterized by its minimal access sets by definition. In this section, we deal
with secret sharing schemes only with the monotone access structure.
Secret sharing schemes have applications in banking systems, cryptographic protocols, electronic voting
systems, and the control of nuclear weapons. In 1979, Shamir and Blakley documented the first secret
sharing schemes in the literature [4], [27].
9B. The covering problem of linear codes
In order to describe the secret sharing scheme of a linear code, we need to introduce the covering
problem of linear codes.
The support of a vector c = (c0, . . . ,cn−1) ∈ GF(p)n is defined as
{0≤ i≤ n−1 : ci 6= 0}.
We say that a vector x covers a vector y if the support of x contains that of y as a proper subset.
A minimal codeword of a linear code C is a nonzero codeword that does not cover any other nonzero
codeword of C . The covering problem of a linear code is to determine all the minimal codewords of C .
This is a very hard problem in general, but can be solved for certain types of linear codes.
C. A construction of secret sharing schemes from linear codes
Any linear code over GF(p) can be employed to construct secret sharing schemes [1], [8], [25], [28].
Given a linear code C over GF(p) with parameters [n,k,d] and generator matrix G = [g0,g1, . . . ,gn−1], we
use d⊥ and H = [h0,h1, . . . ,hn−1] to denote the minimum distance and the generator matrix of its dual
code C⊥.
In the secret sharing scheme based on C , the secret space and the share spaces all are GF(p), and the
participants are denoted by P1,P2, · · · ,Pn−1. To compute shares for all the participants, The dealer chooses
randomly a vector u = (u0, . . . ,un−k−1) such that s = uh0, which is the inner product of the two vectors.
The dealer then treats u as an information vector and computes the corresponding codeword
t = (t0, t1, . . . , tn−1) = uH.
He then gives ti to party Pi as his/her share for each i≥ 1.
The secret recovering procedure is the following. Note that t0 = uh0 = s. A set of shares {ti1, ti2, . . . , tim}
determines the secret s iff h0 is a linear combination of hi1, . . . ,him . Suppose that
h0 =
m
∑
j=1
x jhi j .
Then the secret s is recovered by computing
s =
m
∑
j=1
x jti j .
Equivalently, we look for codewords c of the code C with the shape
(1,0, . . . ,0,ci1,0, . . . ,0,cim,0, . . . ,0)
Hence, the minimal access sets of the secret sharing scheme based on C⊥ correspond to the minimal
codewords in C having 1 as their leftmost component. The other nonzero components correspond to the
participants in the minimal access set. For example, if (1,2,0,0,2) is a codeword of C , then {P1,P4} is
a minimal access set. To obtain the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on C⊥, we need
to determine all minimal codewords of C .
Note that the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on C⊥ is independent of the choice
of the generator matrix H of C⊥. We therefore say that the secret sharing scheme is based on C⊥ without
mentioning the matrix H. We would remind the reader that a linear code gives a pair of secret sharing
schemes. One is based on C and the other is based on C⊥. Below we consider only the latter due to
symmetry.
The access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on a linear code is very complex in general,
but can be determined in certain special cases. The following theorem is proved in [18], [30].
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Theorem 12. Let C be an [n,k,d] code over GF(p), and let G = [g0,g1, · · · ,gn−1] be its generator matrix.
Let d⊥ denote the minimum distance of its dual code C⊥. If each nonzero codeword of C is minimal,
then in the secret sharing scheme based on C⊥, the total number of participants is n−1, and there are
altogether pk−1 minimal access sets.
• When d⊥ = 2, the access structure is as follows.
If gi is a multiple of g0, 1≤ i≤ n−1, then participant Pi must be in every minimal access set.
If gi is not a multiple of g0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, then participant Pi must be in (p−1)pk−2 out of pk−1
minimal access sets.
• When d⊥ ≥ 3, for any fixed 1 ≤ t ≤ min{k−1,d⊥−2} every group of t participants is involved in
(p−1)t pk−(t+1) out of pk−1 minimal access sets.
When the conditions of Theorem 12 are satisfied, the secret sharing scheme based on the dual code
C⊥ is interesting. In the case that d⊥ = 2, some participants must be in every minimal access sets, and
thus are dictators. Such a secret sharing scheme may be required in certain applications. In the case that
d⊥ ≥ 3, each participant plays the same role as he/she is involved in the same number of minimal access
sets. Such a secret sharing scheme is said to be democratic, and may be needed in some other application
scenarios.
A question now is how to construct a linear code whose nonzero codewords all are minimal. The
following lemma provides a guideline in this direction [2], [3].
Lemma 13. Every nonzero codeword of a linear code C over GF(p) is minimal, provided that
wmin
wmax
>
p−1
p
,
where wmax and wmin denote the maximum and minimum nonzero weights in C , respectively.
D. The secret sharing schemes from the codes of this paper
In this subsection, we consider the secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes C⊥D and C ⊥¯D of the
codes CD and C ¯D presented in this paper.
For the code CD of Theorem 1 and the code C ¯D of Corollary 3, we have
wmin
wmax
=
pm−2− p m−32
pm−2 + p
m−3
2
>
p−1
p
if m≥ 5.
Let m ≡ 0 (mod 4) or m ≡ 0 (mod 2) and p ≡ 1 (mod 4). Then for the code CD of Theorem 2 and
the code C
¯D of Corollary 4, we have
wmin
wmax
=
pm−2− p m−22
pm−2
>
p−1
p
if m≥ 4.
Let m ≡ 2 (mod 4) and p ≡ 1 (mod 4). Then for the code CD of Theorem 2 and the code C ¯D of
Corollary 4, we have
wmin
wmax
=
pm−2
pm−2 + p
m−2
2
>
p−1
p
if m≥ 6.
It then follows from Lemma 13 that all the nonzero codewords of CD and C ¯D are minimal if m ≥ 6.
Hence, the secret sharing schemes based on the dual codes C⊥D and C ⊥¯D have the nice access structures
described in Theorem 12.
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As an example, we describe the access structure of the secret sharing scheme based on the dual code
C ⊥¯D of the code C ¯D of Corollary 3 as follows.
Corollary 14. Let m ≥ 5. In the secret sharing scheme based on the dual code C ⊥¯D of the code C ¯D of
Corollary 3, the total number of participants is pm−2, and the total number of minimal access sets is
pm−1. Every participant is a member of exactly (p−1)pm−2 minimal access sets.
Proof: As proved above, every nonzero codeword of C
¯D is minimal as m≥ 5. It can be easily proved
that d⊥ ≥ 3. The desired conclusions then follow from Theorem 12.
As an example of Corollary 14, we have the following.
Example 5. Let m = 5 and p = 5. In the secret sharing scheme based on the dual code C ⊥¯D of the code
C
¯D of Corollary 3, the total number of participants is 125, and the total number of minimal access sets
is 625. Every participant is a member of exactly 500 minimal access sets.
In the secret sharing scheme of Example 5, the secret space is GF(5), which is too small. However, it
can still be employed for sharing a secret of any size. This is done as follows. One can have GF(5h) as
the extended secret space, where h could be as large as one wants (e.g., h = 60). Then any secret can be
encoded as a sequence
s = s1s2 . . .sh
using an encoding scheme, where each si ∈GF(5). Then the secret s can be shared by the 125 participants
symbol by symbol with the secret sharing scheme of Example 5. Hence, the share for each participant
will be a sequence of elements of GF(5) with length h. When a group of participants come together with
their shares, the elements si in the secret s will be recovered one by one using the corresponding elements
in their shares.
Finally, we mention that the secret sharing scheme based on the dual code C ⊥¯D of the code C ¯D of
Corollary 4 has a similar access structure as the one described in Corollary 14. For the linear codes of
Theorems 1 and 2, their dual codes have minimum distance 2. Hence, the secret sharing scheme based on
the dual code C ⊥¯D of the code C ¯D in Theorems 1 and 2 have dictators in the whole group of participants.
Their access structure is given in the first case of Theorem 12.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Calderbank and Kantor surveyed two-weight codes in [6]. There is a recent survey on three-weight
cyclic codes [14]. Some interesting two-weight and three-weight codes were presented in [5], [11], [9],
[21], [22], [23], [26], [29], and [31]. The length of the two-weight and three-weight codes in the literature
usually divides pm−1, while that of the codes presented in this paper does not have this property. We
did not find the parameters of the two-weight and three-weight codes of this paper in the literature.
The two-weight codes CD of this paper give automatically strongly regular graphs having new parameters
with the connection described in [6], and the three-weight codes CD of this paper may yield association
schemes having new parameters with the framework introduced in [5]. The linear codes of this paper can
be employed to construct authentication codes having new parameters via the framework in [13], [17].
For this application, we need to know not only the weight distribution of the linear codes, but also the
distribution of each element of GF(p) in each codeword of the linear code. This is called the complete
weight distribution of a code. Another advantage of the linear codes in this paper is that their complete
weight distribution can be settled with the help of Gaussian sums. In the literature the complete weight
distribution of only a few classes of linear codes is known.
Compared with other two-weight and three-weight codes, the construction method of the codes in this
paper is very simple and is defined by the simple function Tr(x2). This makes the analysis of the linear
codes much easier.
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